Why Climate Action Funding is Not Enough
As the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) approaches in Belém, Brazil, it is clear that the world’s commitment to a just energy transition has largely been abandoned. In the year since governments signed an agreement at COP29 to expand climate action funding—aiming to mobilize $1.3 trillion annually by 2035—wealthy countries have backtracked on their financial pledges. Worse still, these signs of bad faith come at a time when the costs of climate adaptation and decarbonization are rising in developing nations.
If the Global North is no longer prepared to fulfill its financial promises, as now seems certain, it can still demonstrate goodwill through another form of solidarity: by sharing knowledge, technology, and intellectual property that supports the green transition.
This is not a matter that can be postponed. The shift to a green economy is already reproducing the same asymmetries that have long characterized global trade. Instead of fostering inclusive development, climate policy is increasingly shaped by protectionist measures and intellectual property systems that entrench technological monopolies in the Global North. For example, the European Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism can be described as a safeguard against carbon leakage; however, it also illustrates how climate policy can be used to justify trade protectionism.
Furthermore, China’s recent complaint against India regarding its support for electric vehicles and batteries demonstrates how green industrial policies are increasingly becoming a source of trade disputes. These developments collectively indicate a rising tension between climate goals and World Trade Organization rules. Is it possible that measures to combat climate change may soon become a new driver of economic exclusion?
At the heart of this issue lies a shocking imbalance: larger powers such as China, the United States, and the European Union are producing high-value green technologies, while most developing countries remain stuck exporting low-value green goods—primarily critical minerals. This reflects a division of labor from the colonial era, wherein the Global South supplied raw materials, while the North provided innovation, monopolized production, and reaped the vast majority of profits.
Data from the World Intellectual Property Organization emphasizes the depth of this divide, indicating that green patents—related to renewable energy, energy efficiency, and climate adaptation—are overwhelmingly concentrated in a few countries, such as China, the United States, Japan, and Germany. From 2000 to 2024, the top ten economies accounted for nearly 90% of international patent registrations in solar and wind technologies. Despite Brazil ranking sixth globally in installed wind energy, it contributed only 0.4% of global wind patents. Regarding solar energy, its share was a mere 0.19%.
This technological concentration is not coincidental but rather the result of a global intellectual property system that favors monopolistic profits over public benefit. Efforts to enhance global coordination—including via the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement—have failed to address the core issue.
Without access to affordable technologies, the Global South cannot fully participate in the climate transition. Worse yet, the current system threatens to trap developing countries in a new form of dependency, as they provide the minerals needed to manufacture batteries and solar panels without the means to produce them themselves.
Climate action funding alone is insufficient to break this cycle. Instead, technology transfers and reforms to the global intellectual property system must be central to climate negotiations. While the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement acknowledge this, progress has been minimal.
What is encouraging is that the necessary changes are not without precedent. In the early 2000s, Brazil played a pivotal role in reclassifying access to HIV/AIDS medications as a public good rather than a commodity governed solely by intellectual property rights. This shift was driven by a combination of legal, political, and civil society measures that challenged the global pharmaceutical patent system and prioritized public health.
As Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz contends, such mechanisms are essential for correcting market failures and ensuring equitable access to innovation. This is why the International Court of Justice, in its recent advisory opinion on climate change, emphasized the obligation of all states to cooperate—alongside providing funding—to develop and disseminate green technologies, including through knowledge sharing and technology transfer.
The technology implementation program agreed upon at COP28 offers a means to enhance this cooperation. Under Brazil’s leadership at COP30, the technology implementation program can serve as a platform to strengthen national innovation systems, enabling countries to adapt technologies to local contexts and build capacity for climate solutions. The idea is to use a mix of public and private funds to support pilot projects, then scale up those that prove effective.
For instance, we could support a pilot project aimed at producing low-carbon fertilizers using green hydrogen. Currently, ammonia—the main input for nitrogen fertilizers—is produced using hydrogen derived from fossil fuels, which is responsible for about 1-2% of global CO2 emissions. By substituting fossil-based hydrogen with renewable (green) hydrogen, similar ammonia output would lead to significantly lower emissions, while also providing a solution that could be developed and adapted locally. If this pilot project succeeds in this hard-to-abate sector, it would create a replicable model for other countries.
Indeed, Brazil’s presidency of COP30 has the potential to rally the Global South around a vision for a technology implementation program that achieves climate justice through innovation and creativity. This is not just a technical agenda; it is a political agenda. Countries will only be able to build the capacities they need by being empowered to access green technologies. By helping the rest of the world decarbonize, rich countries are also helping themselves.
