Trump and His False Nuclear Gold
Will U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision of building an impenetrable missile defense system be the final nail in the coffin of strategic nuclear arms control? His proposed “Golden Dome” could lead to a costly and destabilizing strategic arms race, turning Trump’s dream into a nightmare for the world.
At the very least, the proposed system represents a dangerous shift in concepts. Significant reductions in nuclear arsenals during the final decades of the Cold War, which continued for nearly a decade afterward, achieved strategic stability. During this time, peace was maintained through deterrence, based on the principle of “mutually assured destruction”—a concept aptly abbreviated to MAD. This principle was formally enshrined in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, wherein the United States and the Soviet Union committed not to build defensive shields against strategic nuclear strikes.
Despite how reckless this concept may seem, the persistent threat of nuclear attack is widely believed to have prevented the exchange of nuclear strikes during the Cold War. The principle of “mutual madness” made direct conflict exceedingly dangerous and unacceptable.
Neither side had an interest in igniting a war that guaranteed mutual destruction. Instead, the Cold War was fought on the sidelines, mostly through proxy wars. Despite extremely dangerous moments—such as the October 1973 War between Arabs and Israel when both the U.S. and the Soviet Union mobilized their nuclear capabilities—there was no direct violent confrontation between the two powers.
From time to time, some political leaders imagined alternative arrangements. For instance, U.S. President Ronald Reagan dreamed of a world free of nuclear weapons and launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as “Star Wars”) to build a space-based missile defense system. However, the idea proved to be excessively costly and likely impractical.
In 2002, President George W. Bush withdrew from the Strategic Defense Treaty, allowing the U.S. to develop its current defense system. Yet, these defenses remain limited, largely untested, and aimed primarily at intercepting a handful of North Korean missiles. Should Russia decide to launch a large-scale nuclear attack, the current U.S. defenses would not withstand it.
Bush’s decision prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin to invest massive resources in developing weapons that could evade future American defenses. Among these weapons is a long-range nuclear torpedo capable of bypassing traditional defenses, along with a nuclear-powered cruise missile with unlimited range that could potentially infiltrate from Mexican airspace. Despite decades of work, these weapons remain far from operational. Yet, little remains of earlier arms control efforts except the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which Russia suspended in 2023, and which is set to expire next February unless a new agreement is reached.
In this context, Trump proposes his “Golden Dome.” While Trump’s enthusiastic statements about “ending the missile threat to the American homeland forever” have no connection to reality, it is certain that his administration will allocate hundreds of billions of dollars to develop more sophisticated—though questionable in efficacy—systems. Worse, Russia and China will view these initiatives as threats to their nuclear strategic capabilities. If these nations believe that the United States has become invulnerable while its deterrent capability is jeopardized, nuclear calculations will shift.
This is particularly applicable to Russia, whose strategic nuclear power is a cornerstone of its claim to still be a great power. Undermining Russia’s ability to deliver a nuclear strike could trigger a near-existential fear among its strategists. From China’s perspective, the concerns may be similar, if somewhat less intense, as China’s strength is built on a broader foundation.
If the United States spends tens of billions on missile defenses, Russia will feel compelled to expend everything it can to counter those new capabilities. Whether Russia can bear this burden is entirely uncertain; clearly, it will have to sacrifice other priorities. The decline of its space program demonstrates the financial difficulties it already faces. Nevertheless, these changes will not necessarily lead to global stability. While the old strategic arms control systems provided clarity regarding the balance of power, the new situation will be more opaque and volatile.
Managing the strategic bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia has been complicated enough. A triangular relationship that also includes China—which is expanding its nuclear arsenal—would be even more complex, and if it also includes France and Britain, it could devolve into real chaos. The more chaotic things become, the greater the chances that misunderstandings or marginal conflicts will escalate into something more dangerous.
Both Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have described the “Golden Dome” proposal as a “full and final rejection of recognizing the inextricable link between strategic offensive and defensive arms,” and they are not incorrect. However, they do not offer alternatives or ideas for better managing these risks.
As concerns from Russia and China escalate, the “Golden Dome” is unlikely—ironically—to guarantee U.S. security. We have just seen that both advanced Israeli and American systems couldn’t prevent several Iranian missiles from reaching central Tel Aviv. With nuclear warheads, just one missile could spell disaster.
There are no easy solutions. While the dream of creating an impenetrable defense system will never die, the logic of nuclear stability is straightforward. Even in these troubled times, some channels of dialogue must be maintained between the concerned powers.
