Europe Must Change Its Approach Toward Africa
Carlos Lopes: Honorary Professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town, Visiting Professor at Sciences Po, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Member of the Global Resource Institute Council, Chair of the African Climate Foundation, and the African Union’s High Representative for Relations with Europe. He is the author of the book, "The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Africa’s Dependence on Charity in Its Relationship with Europe" (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).
In recent years, China has overtaken Europe in terms of trade with sub-Saharan Africa and investment in its infrastructure. At the same time, Gulf countries are reshaping financial flows across the continent, while Brazil, India, and Turkey deepen their ties with African nations. Meanwhile, African leaders have established the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), expected to transform trade within the continent. However, the European Union continues to act under the illusion that it is Africa’s primary partner.
Consequently, as Africa repositions itself strategically in a multipolar world, Europe remains largely complacent, viewing itself as a normative power, a global champion of human rights, democracy, and sustainability. While this may hold true in some areas, Europe’s trade and economic relations—particularly with Africa—suggest otherwise, and until now, Europe has shown no willingness to change.
As the African Union’s High Representative for Relations with Europe, I have witnessed this situation closely. In 2019, I proposed that the African Union be granted an official mandate to negotiate a continental trade agreement with the European Union. This idea was not revolutionary; it reflected Africa’s legitimate demand for collective bargaining power, which the African Union has become qualified for after making significant progress toward political harmony.
However, the European Commission holds more influence when negotiating with individual countries or regional blocs, and African actors within this fragmented system are hesitant to relinquish their intermediary roles. As a result, my proposal was stifled, and the EU continued to bypass African Union institutions in favor of bilateral agreements or regional initiatives that do not align with Africa’s needs, interests, and priorities.
A prominent example of this is the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the European Union and African countries (or groups of countries). These agreements deepened Africa’s dependence on exporting raw materials and limited the policy space available for manufacturing in African countries. European exporters benefited significantly from these agreements, while African nations struggled to leverage trade to develop their local industries or transition to higher value-added activities.
Simultaneously, European investments primarily flow into extractive activities, migration control, and climate compensation, rather than enhancing industrial value chains or technology transfer. Despite the hype surrounding the EU’s Global Gateway initiative—aimed at strengthening digital, energy, and transport connections "smart, clean, and safe," as well as supporting "health, education, and research systems"—its ambition pales in comparison to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or even America’s Green Transformation packages.
Moreover, the European Union does not share the risks associated with its investments in Africa but instead transfers them to the continent, expecting private capital to take the lead, while development financing remains far below what is needed to stimulate industrial transformation. It demands that Africa mitigate risks for investors without offering structural guarantees, such as improved access to financial markets, preferential trade terms, or long-term commitments.
However, the ongoing changes in the global system present a crucial opportunity for Europe to rebuild its relationship with Africa. The United States is retreating from the continent by imposing high tariffs, cutting aid, and reducing its diplomatic presence. More broadly, the global economy is undergoing a radical transformation, as the multilateral system that promoted free trade and financial market liberalization is being replaced by a more fragmented structure, with new rules being drafted by the world’s major powers, often disregarding the needs and interests of developing economies.
In a world where trade is dictated by market power rather than comparative advantage, Africa must adapt. This means building productive capacities instead of waiting for concessions, creating an African business ecosystem instead of submitting to compliance-based negotiations, and finding ways to reshape global value chains in favor of Africa rather than merely joining existing frameworks. To achieve this, Africa does not need patrons but strategic partners who acknowledge its capabilities, invest in its production, and align with its priorities.
If Europe hopes to play this role, it must begin by shedding the belief that it is Africa’s default partner; influence must be earned.
Cooperation between Africa and the European Union should also occur within the African institutional framework, especially in areas such as trade, digital governance, and climate diplomacy. The EU must cease bypassing the African Union and recognize it as Africa’s legitimate representative, with European economic participation grounded in the logic of the African Continental Free Trade Area—Africa’s most significant economic innovation in decades—rather than conflicting with it.
Additionally, the EU must separate aid from moral oversight; developmental aid is not a "gift," but a geopolitical tool, and its excessive conditions often undermine the institutions it aims to support. Rather than tightly controlling governance reforms, Europe should focus on supporting Africa’s aspirations, including infrastructure, education, and industrial transformation.
One of the best ways to achieve this is through joint investment with African partners in regional value chains, supporting African industries not as beneficiaries but as equal players, rethinking the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy that distorts African food systems, and removing non-tariff barriers that penalize African exporters.
Finally, at international forums, the EU must coordinate with the African Union on issues such as debt reform, climate financing, and intellectual property rights. Africa’s call for a mechanism to address its sovereign debt should be met with concrete proposals, not mere consultancy services, and climate financing should reflect historical responsibilities and real costs, not just political calculations.
As for the African Union, it must be more assertive in demanding genuine structural shifts in the continent’s relationships, moving beyond mere sweet talk about African sovereignty. This includes reaffirming the role of the African Union in all external partnerships, rejecting external interference in African integration processes, and investing in the capacity to propose alternative economic frameworks. The African Union should engage in multilateral reform policies—not merely as a requester but as a stakeholder with a clear agenda.
