Morocco is gearing up for its legislative elections set for September 23, 2026, but this contest signifies more than just a battle for parliamentary seats. A complex political landscape is emerging, dominated by three intertwined factors: a narrow voter base, a profound rearrangement of power within political parties, and a rising call for ethical governance, which may exclude certain candidates from running even before the official campaign begins.
Viewing the upcoming elections solely through the lens of the 2021 results presents an incomplete picture. While those figures provide a starting point, they do not predict who will cross the finish line or even who will be allowed to take their place at the starting line.
Narrow Voter Base Shifts Power Dynamics
One fundamental aspect of Moroccan elections is that the actual electorate is significantly smaller than the total number of eligible voters. A substantial number of citizens are either unregistered, abstaining, indecisive, or part of a young demographic that feels disconnected from traditional political parties. Consequently, the real competition is limited to a relatively small pool of voters.
This reality alters the nature of the electoral battle. In elections characterized by broad participation, popular sentiment can disrupt expectations and propel new faces into power. However, when the effective voter base is restricted, the advantage shifts to parties with strong organizational structures, known local candidates, established networks, and the ability to mobilize their supporters on election day.
Thus, raw popularity and media presence are inadequate for victory. A politician may accumulate millions of views online, but they can still lose to a candidate well-known in their community who commands a reliable network of supporters, ensuring they reach the polls. This is why parties such as the National Rally of Independents (RNI), the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), and the Istiqlal Party remain formidable; their strength lies not only in their national leadership but also in their territorial reach and established electoral networks. Meanwhile, both the Popular Movement and the Socialist Union continue to secure seats that do not reflect their media presence.
However, the confined voter base poses a political risk: it could produce a legitimate parliament that fails to reflect the broader societal mood, particularly among the youth who increasingly express their discontent outside conventional political channels. Thus, increasing voter turnout becomes integral to the battle for political legitimacy, transcending mere technical considerations.
Lajouij Enters the Fray, Strengthening PAM’s Position
Fouad Lajouij’s formal entry into the PAM marks a significant event, far more than an ordinary organizational shift. He does not join as a fresh-faced activist beginning at the branch level; instead, he brings with him considerable technical, political, and popular capital.
As a skilled budget manager and a prominent figure in strategic initiatives, Lajouij’s involvement adds a new dynamic, providing PAM with a nationally recognizable candidate capable of delivering results. His role goes beyond merely heading the party; under Article 47 of the constitution, the monarch appoints the Prime Minister from the political party that wins the most seats in the House of Representatives, not necessarily the party leader.
This means that while Fatima Zahra Mansouri may continue to lead PAM and run its campaign, Lajouij remains a viable candidate for Prime Minister if PAM emerges victorious. He is not constitutionally required to be the party’s national coordinator to enter the governmental candidacy ring.
Consequently, Lajouij’s position as a member of the political bureau could be more significant than it initially appears. He is now officially entrenched in the party without needing to bear the daily burdens of organizational conflicts. If PAM leads the results, he will be a prominent contender in discussions surrounding the prime minister’s appointment.
However, his path is rife with challenges. The popularity he garnered in sports will undergo its first political test, with pressing questions regarding budget management, inflation, taxation, and public spending looming large—issues more complex than the victories celebrated in sports.
The question thus becomes not whether Lajouij can attract attention—he has already done so—but whether PAM can convert his symbolic capital into tangible votes and parliamentary seats.
Akhannouch’s Departure: A Step Back, Not Out
Interpreting Aziz Akhannouch’s decision not to run for a third term as head of the RNI as a definitive withdrawal from politics would be a hasty conclusion. He has not severed ties with the party or its structures; rather, he has stepped down after a decade of rebuilding the party, expanding its electoral clout, and leading it to victory in the 2021 elections.
The election of Mohamed Chouki, a figure closely aligned with Akhannouch and his leadership experience, suggests a more orderly transition within the party than a complete break. Thus, Akhannouch retains his influence, networks, and experiences even as he distances himself from daily party management.
Importantly, Akhannouch remains a reassuring figure for international economic and investment circles, crucial as Morocco seeks to bolster investor confidence and expedite strategic projects. In a landscape demanding investment, this façade of stability can benefit his party and keep it relevant in future political calculations.
Furthermore, interpreting the prevailing mood on social media as a precise reflection of the electorate would be misguided. Digital platforms amplify the voices of dissent and criticisms but do not accurately represent voter behavior or the ability of parties to mobilize supporters on election day. Digital engagement, no matter how extensive, does not automatically translate into votes at the polls.
Conversely, the RNI benefits from a network of local leaders and parliamentarians with proven track records in their areas. In elections reliant on local presence and personal trust, a voter’s assessment of their immediate candidate may differ significantly from their view of the national government.
The past decade of Akhannouch’s governance carries weight, encapsulating both social and political costs alongside essential stability in administration and significant social projects. Therefore, the RNI enters the 2026 elections neither as a party in decline nor without its past glories. Instead, it does so with a fresh leadership dynamic and a legacy still very much alive.
Istiqlal’s Ongoing Influence Amidst Challenges
While the focus often rests on the rivalry between PAM and RNI, the electoral weight of the Istiqlal Party should not be underestimated. Securing 81 seats in the 2021 elections, Istiqlal closely followed PAM, which won 87, and RNI with its 102 seats.
Istiqlal possesses enduring strengths: a long political history, a clear party identity, a robust organizational infrastructure across the kingdom, and a network of elected officials and trade unionists. It appeals to conservative demographics, the middle class, and many working-class citizens, led by Nizar Baraka, who combines political experience with economic expertise and governmental experience.
However, the party faces considerable challenges in overcoming its association with the current government. Although it has attempted to distance itself from the prime minister and his government’s criticisms, these efforts have thus far failed to remove it from accountability. Istiqlal is not an opposition party; it is a key component of the governing majority, responsible for significant portfolios and collective decision-making.
Thus, it cannot afford to critique Akhannouch without acknowledging its role in the governance framework. For Istiqlal to position itself as a credible alternative in the 2026 elections, it must clarify to the public what changes it would implement if it were to win.
It’s important to remember that online sentiments may not always align with electoral realities. While social platforms reflect certain discontent or targeted campaigns against the party, they do not capture the entire spectrum of voter opinions or geographic and social distributions among the electorate.
Ultimately, even a party appearing weak in digital realms may boast a robust local network capable of mobilizing voters. Istiqlal, particularly, is one such party that tends to resonate more significantly on the ground than its digital presence suggests.
As such, evaluating Istiqlal’s prospects should not rely solely on social media discourse but anchor in the capabilities of its candidates, organizational unity, retention of existing constituents, and ability to attract new names.
Returning to Power: Justice and Development Party’s Strategy
The Justice and Development Party (JDP) enters the 2026 elections with a different strategy. Rather than defending a current government record, it is banking on leveraging public discontent with rising costs, unemployment, and dwindling trust in intermediary institutions to fuel a punitive voting response.
The party, which plummeted from 125 seats in 2016 to just 13 in 2021, still maintains a disciplined organizational base, digital presence, and mobilization capability, bolstered by the ongoing influence of Abdelilah Benkirane.
A confined voter base may also favor JDP; parties with loyal, ideological followers often benefit during low turnout more than those reliant on a wider but less committed audience. However, a resurgence does not guarantee a return to the forefront, as the memories of a decade in power linger, along with internal struggles that have weakened the party.
It is likely that the JDP can regain a substantial parliamentary presence, possibly leading the opposition, but it will require a substantial electoral wave to regain its former dominance.
Union Socialists: Potential Beyond Their Media Presence
Entering the 2021 elections with 34 seats, the Socialist Union proved its capacity to maintain a significant parliamentary position despite the decline of the historical left and its diminished public profile compared to previous years.
Its strengths lie in electoral experience, presence in various constituencies, candidate recruitment, and adaptability in forming alliances. Currently, however, the party appears unable to generate a nationwide wave to propel itself to electoral dominance due to a lack of a unifying political narrative.
Again, measuring the Union Socialist’s weight based solely on social media does not yield a complete picture. While its digital presence may be limited, some candidates retain strong local ties and electoral networks, facilitating success in their districts.
Therefore, while the Union Socialist may not be positioned to lead the government, it remains well-placed to become a pivotal force in its formation, particularly if the top three parties yield closely contested results requiring a moderate ally to secure a stable majority.
Movement Party: Quiet Local Strength
In the 2021 elections, the Popular Movement secured 28 seats, drawing its strength from its rural presence, particularly in mountainous areas, and its extensive affiliations within numerous communities and local networks, enriched by its Amazigh and historical roots.
This influence may not always be evident in media discussions or on social platforms, as much of the movement’s support lies in regions where personal trust and local relationships outweigh the impact of major digital campaigns.
Mohamed Ouzine has revitalized the party’s communication strategy, but it still faces challenges extending its reach beyond traditional strongholds and evolving from a rural- and region-focused entity to a national political force appealing to urban centers, youth, and the middle class.
Like the Union Socialist, the Popular Movement does not seem poised for electoral leadership. However, it could maintain a significant parliamentary block, positioning it as a sought-after partner in the upcoming majority’s formation. In a fragmented scene, the seats held by a middle-tier party may wield more influence than the slim margin between the leading and second parties.
Political Integrity Reform May Alter Candidate Lists
The most sensitive factor in the upcoming elections may not just be a transfer of voter allegiance from one party to another, but the likelihood of certain candidates not making it to the polls at all. The overarching trend points towards stricter candidacy requirements and linking the electoral process to improving political integrity, particularly after the current term saw several parliamentarians stripped of their positions due to legal or electoral violations.
These new integrity rules do not only address the voting day; they encompass everything from candidate registration to campaigning and the execution of mandates. The debates surrounding endorsements and candidate quality are central to preparations for the 2026 elections.
Nonetheless, it is crucial to discern between three different levels of scrutiny. The first involves disqualification or loss of eligibility based on legal stipulations or court rulings. The second concerns the rejection of candidacies by relevant authorities that do not meet the necessary criteria, allowing the candidate the right to appeal judicially. The third is a party’s decision not to endorse a candidate under scrutiny, even in the absence of a final ruling against them.
It is likely that parties will lean towards the third level—proactively excluding candidates with questionable backgrounds. Presenting a candidate burdened by multiple issues can risk the party’s reputation, leading to potential disqualification, election reruns, or public scandal repercussions.
Thus, we may witness a “preventive cleaning” of candidate lists: those previously deemed electable could be sidelined if their ethical burdens outweigh their electoral value.
However, integrity reforms must not devolve into purges based on allegations or tools for eliminating competition. Media allegations should not equate to legal judgments, and unproven accusations should not automatically serve as legal barriers. Successful reform requires transparency in criteria, well-formulated decisions, the right to appeal, and equitable application across all parties and candidates. The objective is to safeguard institutions from corruption, not to invert the presumption of innocence into a presumption of suspicion.
Implications of Excluding Certain Candidates
In a narrow voter base, the exclusion of even a handful of strong candidates can significantly alter outcomes across entire electoral districts, potentially reshaping party standings and which party leads the elections. Moroccan elections are not strictly about voting for a party label; for many voters, personal connections and local networks often take precedence.
If a party loses its strongest candidate due to legal barriers or disqualifications, a portion of its electoral base may migrate to a rival that presents a substitute candidate. This represents a genuine test for parties: Are they capable institutions that can cultivate candidates from within, or merely vessels for the same political names?
If integrity reforms succeed, they may usher in fresh talents and candidates less beholden to money and local influence. Conversely, if the focus remains solely on the removal of specific individuals while maintaining the status quo of entrenched local elites, we would only witness a reshuffle of faces without addressing the underlying electoral system.
Possible Future Majority Scenarios
The current political landscape does not allow for a pre-emptive declaration of a winner but does permit identification of four main political poles: PAM, with Lajouij and a solid local network, presents a viable candidate for Prime Minister; RNI, while boasting a significant electoral machinery and strong community presence, faces its first major test under new leadership; Istiqlal holds a genuine opportunity to advance if it positions itself as a distinct alternative rather than an extension of its coalition partners; and JDP banks on exploiting voter anger and low turnout, possibly becoming a primary opposition force or an unexpected surprise.
Behind these parties, others are unlikely to take the lead but may influence the majority’s composition—particularly the Socialist Union, Popular Movement, Progress and Socialism, and Constitutional Union. In a Parliament where no single party can achieve an absolute majority, the fourth or fifth party could wield more impact on government formation than the numerical difference between the top two parties.
Elections: Who Reaches the Starting Line?
Thus, the 2026 elections may diverge from previous ones. They will not simply determine who wins but also who qualifies to run, who parties endorse, who meets eligibility requirements, and who retains their seat post-election.
Given the narrow voting base, any change in candidate lists could have far-reaching ramifications. With the monarch empowered to appoint the Prime Minister from within the leading party, not necessarily from its official leadership, the names currently under consideration within political bureaux could bear more significance than the slogans raised during the campaign.
Lajouij could become a key contender if PAM tops the results. Akhannouch may have stepped down as RNI leader, but he could still remain in the constitutional running if his party enhances its standing. Nizar Baraka leads a party that is within reach of the top spots. Meanwhile, JDP awaits the opportunity to transform discontent into electoral support.
Above all these calculations remains the paramount question: Will the 2026 elections succeed in broadening participation, renewing political elites, and restoring public trust, or will they merely rearrange the seats within a limited electoral system?
The answer will not only determine which party or who the next Prime Minister will be but also whether these elections can mark a new political epoch or simply perpetuate the existing order.
