Radio ExpressTV
Live
The Dangerous Legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei
By Bejah Bani Hashimi: A researcher in constitutional law at the University of Chicago and a lecturer on human rights law, focusing on power structures and political change in the Middle East.
Within hours of the massive explosion near the headquarters of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran on the morning of February 28, Israeli and American sources announced—and later confirmed by official Iranian media—that Khamenei had been killed.
In Iranian cities and among Iranian communities in the diaspora, spontaneous celebrations erupted, venting long-standing public anger accumulated over decades of repression under Khamenei’s regime, including the violent crackdown in January on nationwide protests that reportedly resulted in the deaths or arrests of tens of thousands of demonstrators. However, the shock of Khamenei’s death does not necessarily imply the collapse of the security and political apparatus he spent nearly four decades constructing. In fact, this institutional framework of power might indeed be his most enduring legacy.
When the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died in 1989, only a few political insiders envisioned Khamenei as a dominant or reformist successor. According to Article 109 of the Iranian Constitution, the Supreme Leader was originally required to hold the rank of “Marja’ Taqlid” or Grand Ayatollah, the highest level of Shiite religious authority—a qualification that Khamenei lacked.
However, just months after Khomeini’s death, Article 109 was amended. The requirement for the title of Grand Ayatollah, the highest religious rank, was replaced with broader political and religious qualifications. Simultaneously, the model of an all-powerful supreme leader with extensive authority was reinforced. Many, including influential revolutionary figures, envisioned Khamenei taking on a more symbolic role, delegating governing power to elected officials such as the president. They were utterly mistaken.
Over the following decades, Khamenei gradually transformed the Supreme Leader’s position from an oversight authority into the central governing structure of the Islamic Republic. His most significant political innovation was the reformation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While Khomeini emphasized limiting the military’s political involvement, Khamenei leveraged Article 110 of the Constitution—which grants the Supreme Leader command over all armed forces—to create a loyal security apparatus.
Under Khamenei’s leadership, the IRGC evolved from merely a military institution to a political and economic conglomerate deeply embedded in virtually every major sector of Iran’s economy, from infrastructure and construction to telecommunications, energy projects, and oil trade. The system Khamenei established became one in which military loyalty, financial interests, and regime survival reinforced each other. His political power was secured as much through institutional reliance as it was by ideology.
To further solidify his authority, Khamenei exerted control over the Guardian Council, which was established under Article 91 of the Constitution to maintain institutional balance. The Guardian Council consists of six Islamic jurists directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and six legal experts nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the parliament. However, under Article 157, the Supreme Leader appoints the head of the judiciary, thereby having the final say over all twelve members. Over time, the Guardian Council’s power to vet parliamentary candidates allowed it to narrow the political field to individuals deemed acceptable by the regime.
A similar dynamic evolved within the Assembly of Experts. Under Articles 107 and 111 of the Constitution, the assembly is responsible for overseeing the Supreme Leader and appointing his successor. This body is supposed to be one of the few constitutional checks on his power. However, in practice, the Guardian Council must first approve the candidates, creating a feedback loop in which the Supreme Leader’s influence extends to the institution tasked with overseeing him.
The Iranian Constitution provides a legal mechanism for leadership succession. Article 111 states that executive power upon the Supreme Leader’s death or incapacity transitions to a temporary council composed of the president, the head of the judiciary, and a jurist from the Guardian Council selected by the Expediency Discernment Council. But this presumes institutional independence, which Khamenei has effectively undermined.
Nonetheless, the system Khamenei helped create will persist beyond his death. The networks governing the judiciary, security institutions, and religious establishments remain deeply interconnected. During Khamenei’s rule, the authorities increasingly relied on a mix of religious legitimacy, military loyalty, and economic control—all of which are entrenched in constitutional mechanisms designed to concentrate power while maintaining appearances of legitimacy. Khamenei’s successor will not only inherit a political position but also an institutional framework designed to reproduce central authority.
As such, Iran faces a moment of profound authoritarian uncertainty, where the collapse of the regime or an expected transfer of power does not appear likely. The governing institutions will remain intact even as political legitimacy wanes and succession disputes arise, possibly violently. In the absence of structural reforms, a similar concentration of power may shift to a new Supreme Leader, perpetuating political stagnation in Iran.
Real and lasting change in Iran will depend less on who succeeds Khamenei than on whether it is possible to dismantle his institutional legacy. The problem is that beneficiaries of the old regime are unlikely to accept a completely new governance framework quietly. Without comprehensive reform of the executive power, the economic dominance of the IRGC, and the mechanisms that control political participation, the authoritarian regime in Iran will simply rebalance itself.
