Israel and Its Risky Strategy in Syria
After months of sectarian violence, kidnappings, and cross-border clashes, the last thing the fledgling government in Syria needs is a neighbor exacerbating tensions. Yet, this is precisely what Israel is doing, establishing military bases in the demilitarized “buffer zone” between the two countries, attacking military positions, and killing security officials—all part of a worn-out strategy to support minority groups against the Sunni majority in the Arab world. By pursuing this strategy in Syria, Israel risks provoking a strategic backlash.
Alongside neighboring Lebanon, Syria has the most diverse demographic composition in the Middle East. While Sunni Arabs make up 65% of the population, their majority is considerably less than that in Egypt, for example (about 90%). The remaining 35% of Syria’s population consists of members of various Islamic sects, as well as Sunni Kurds and Christians.
Managing this diversity has proven challenging for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which rose to power following the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad in December. Its members are derived from al-Qaeda, which holds that Sunni Arabs should dominate politically in the Islamic world. Although the leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has tempered its religious fervor, some of its fighters have not.
In March, clashes between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Alawite sect to which Assad belongs—a deviant Shia branch representing about 12% of Syria’s population—resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 people. This violence has unsettled Christians, who largely supported the toppled government. Meanwhile, Turkey-backed groups clashed with the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by Kurds, in the northeast.
However, tensions with the Druze, another sect that diverges from the mainstream, are proving to be the most troubling for the young Syrian government. After a false audio recording purporting to be a Druze leader insulting the Prophet Muhammad circulated on social media, masked gunmen attacked the suburb of Jaramana in Damascus. After this incident, which drew security officials from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Israel announced it would protect the small Druze community. Since then, Israel has targeted Syrian security personnel clashing with the Druze and conducted airstrikes near the presidential palace.
Israel’s schemes in Syria are nothing new. Within months of Israel’s founding, senior officials in the Israeli Foreign Ministry considered overseeing a coup there to enhance their position during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
Overall, Israel has often leveraged minority support to undermine Sunni power. In Lebanon, the Christians were a minority. In 1955, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan proposed convincing a Christian military officer to "declare himself the savior of the Maronite population" before invading Lebanon to help install a Christian regime allied with Israel.
In the 1970s, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin—claiming it was Israel’s "duty" to prevent the Palestine Liberation Organization from committing "genocide" against Christians—backed a defected Lebanese Christian sergeant in hopes of establishing a buffer zone along southern Lebanon’s borders where Israel could exert some control. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization, and installed Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, who was soon assassinated by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
Israel’s efforts to undermine Sunni regimes have required partnerships with Shia states. Starting in the 1960s, Israel worked with the Shah of Iran to support Iraqi Kurds in their fight against the central government. This resulting insurgency was so destructive that then-Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein ceded the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran in exchange for a pledge not to support the Kurds.
Given this history, it is not surprising that Israeli leaders are now seeking to carve out a Druze enclave on the Syrian border, thus creating a barrier between Israel and Sunnis. It is also unsurprising that Israel has identified ambitious Druze figures eager to challenge the central government and even their traditional leadership.
This effort has garnered wide support among Israeli politicians, from the Prime Minister to the opposition leader. They perceive that a fragmented Syria desperately attempting to extinguish regional and sectarian fires will lack the resources and capability to threaten Israel.
However, this perspective is short-sighted. Ultimately, the unrest and divisions could lead to the collapse of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and Israel may not welcome any successor that emerges. Turkish supporters of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, who back factions along the northern Syrian border, may be convinced to deploy forces deeper into the country. The resurgent Islamic State may exploit the chaos following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s downfall to expand its influence, just as it did when the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011. After Gemayel’s assassination in 1982, Hezbollah replaced his government in southern Lebanon. By 2000, Hezbollah succeeded in ousting Israel from Lebanese territory, and in 2006, it launched a destructive war that ended in stalemate.
Following the collapse of Assad’s regime, Israel gained what seemed to be a strategic advantage in the Middle East. Destabilizing a fledgling government unwilling to engage with a stronger neighbor will do nothing to bolster this position. On the contrary, a self-defeating arrogant policy threatens to pave the way for a new formidable threat to arise.
